Nikolaj von Kreitor
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NATO AND THE ARCHITECTS
OF THE AMERICAN LEBENSRAUM
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American Blueprint for World Hegemony
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| It was John O’Sullivan who in 1845 formulated the
concept of American Lebensraum - the Manifest Destiny Doctrine. He coined
the term to signify the mission of the United States "to overspread the
continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly
multiplying millions."(1) For Josiah Strong, the American missionary imperialist
par excellence, the Manifest Destiny had geopolitical destination—the creation
of a world empire. The America would be the greatest of all empires. "Other
nations would bring their offerings to the cradle of the young empire of
the West , as they had once taken their gifts to the cradle of Jesus."(2)
Since the destiny and its destination were preordained by God , Americans
possessed supreme title to space, preempting and superseding the right
of others. Combined with the Monroe Doctrine, the theological rationale
of the Manifest Destiny Doctrine provided an almost evangelical explanation
of the geopolitical manifest design to conquer and subjugate space, first
the whole Western Hemisphere and then, beginning with the war against Spain
in 1898, the whole world. As Carl Schmitt has pointed out, in 1898 USA
embarked on a war against Spain and latter against the world which has
not ended yet. In this context the American war against Yugoslavia is only
a continuation of the one hundred years war which the United States began
in 1898.
In the history of the United States the expansionist impulse
has been as powerful as religion. The continuity of American expansionist
war aims since the time of the Manifest Destiny Doctrine has been the most
predominant feature of American foreign policy in which the three components
of American expansionist Weltanschauung confluence: The Manifest Destiny
Doctrine – the theological component – conquest preordained by God and
Providence to carry the will of the Almighty, and subsequently, conquest
to establish democracy or in the interests of democracy or mankind, The
Monroe Doctrine –the geopolitical component and the Open Door Doctrine
—the economical component.
It was at the end of the last century that the intellectual
foundations of the American geopolitical doctrine were formulated by Frederick
Jackson Turner, Brooks Adams, admiral Mahan, and its implementation begun
by Theodore Roosevelt and subsequently Woodrow Wilson. The geopolitical
concepts advanced by Frederick Jackson Turner, Brooks Adams and admiral
Mahan "became a world view, an expansionist Weltanschauung for subsequent
generation of Americans and ... important to understand America’s imperial
expansion in the twentieth century," writes the noted American historian
William Williams. The policies of American Lebensraum, called "Open-Door"
imperialism, and the enlargement of the American empire through expansion
of the perimeter of the Monroe Doctrine, is the explanation of America’s
foreign policy during this century, including the present policies of NATO
expansion, assertion of American preponderance of power over the whole
Eurasia and the war against Yugoslavia.
The architects of the American Lebensraum provided also
the rationale for NATO. NATO as a geopolitical construct is firmly anchored
in the "Frontier thesis" of the American expansionist foreign policy, appearing
as a function and instrument of the Atlantic Grossraum, as envisioned by
Turner, Adams and Mahan. Or as Senator Tom Connally stated: "the
Atlantic Pact is the logical extension of the Monroe Doctrine". The creation
of the NATO signified the extension of the Monroe doctrine
to Europe - Europe would become for the United States another Latin America,
points out the American historian Stephen Ambrose. (3)
Frederick Jackson Turner’s main concept was that America’s
uniqueness was the product of an expanding frontier. He defined American
historical existence as perpetual geopolitical expansion toward new frontiers
in the West. "The existence of an area of free land , its continuous
recession , and the advance of American settlement westward explains the
American development"(4) The "universal disposition of the
Americans", an "expanding people, is to enlarge their dominion" and that
the ongoing geopolitical enlargement "is the actual result of an expansive
power which is inherent in them"(5), claimed Turner. Thus American history
is a history of "continually advancing frontier line…The frontier is the
line of most rapid and effective Americanization…Movement has been its
dominant, and …the American energy will continually demand a wider field
for its exercise"(6)
"The other idea ( in the American imperialist Weltanschauung)
is the thesis of Brooks Adams that America’s uniqueness could be preserved
only by a foreign policy of expansionism."(7) Adams idea was
calculated to preserve Turner’s explanation of American past and project
it into the future. "Taken together, the ideas of Turner and Adams supplied
American empire builders with an overview and explanation of the world,
and a reasonably specific program of action from 1893 to 1953", points
out William Williams. "Expansion was the catechism by this young messiah
of America’s uniqueness and omnipotence...Turner gave Americans a nationalistic
world view that eased their doubts... and justified their aggressiveness."(8)
Turner, looking at the American past , saw in the final conquest of West
the realization of Manifest Destiny in the Western Hemisphere. Adams saw
the coming new frontier - the whole world. His mondial vision was inevitable
leading to a one world empire—the American World Empire, not plurality
of Grossraüme or Panregions, as envisioned by Carl Schmitt or general
Haushofer.
Brooks Adams’ The Law of Civilization and Decay(9) (1895)
was "a frontier thesis for the world."(10) He propounded a policy of aggressive
expansionism designed to make Asia an economic colony, allowing America
to acquire a large new frontier in Asia. Essentially the conquest
of Eurasia was commenced then. "One even reissued his foreign policy recommendations
of the 1890’s as a guide for the United States in the Cold War,"(11) points
out William Williams. In his book "American Empire"(12) (1911) Brooks Adams
envisioned the coming of the American world empire and the conquest of
all Eurasian geopolitical space. Theodore Roosevelt’s, and Woodrow Wilson’s
interpretation of the westward movement as a civilizing conquest of Eurasia
was influenced by the works of Turner and Adams. Adams" use economic and
military power to expand the frontier of the United States westward"(13)
Brooks Adam’s expansionist design was the foundation of
American foreign policy —expansionism first in Asia, then in Europe. "Wilson
relied extensively on Turner’s frontier thesis in presenting his own interpretation
of American history" ‘All I ever wrote on the subject came from him’",
pointed Woodrow Wilson.(14) Borrowing from the vocabulary of the Manifest
Destiny Doctrine - Wilson’s slogan "World safe for democracy" - meant in
reality world safe for policies of American Lebensraum. As William’s adds
" even more than in the case of Theodore Roosevelt, the policies of Woodrow
Wilson and subsequently Franklin Delano Roosevelt were classic Turneris.(15)
Turner’s frontier thesis made democracy (i.e. American dominion ) a function
of an expanding frontier." F.D. Roosevelt has always been ...a Turnean
in foreign policy...Roosevelt ‘s Turnerism was meanwhile blended with the
realpolitik of Adams." (16)
Woodrow Wilson was the first who gave a glimpse of the
coming American world hegemony. Already conceiving Great Britain
subjugated by the United States and thus John Bull transformed to an obedient
servant of the overseas Atlantic Master, Adams saw the main enemy in continental
Europe.
"The acceleration of movement, which is thus concentrating the
strong, is so rapidly crushing the weak that the moment seems at hand when
two great competing systems will be pitted against each other, and the
struggle for survival will begin...Whether we like it or not , we are forced
to compete for the seat of international exchange, or, in other worlds,
for the seat of empire.....Our adversary (France, Germany and Russia) is
deadly and determined...If we yield before him , he will stuffle us" (17)
Economic supremacy, claimed Adams, was the basis for all
power (18). Free trade and economic internationalism i.e. international
economy under American control, was the key to world domination.
"Adams argued that the United States must take an increasingly large role
in policing the world order. "Economic (and moral) power had to be translated
into military power if America was to have, as Franklin D. Roosevelt (influenced
by Adams) put it, its "rendezvous with destiny".(19) Adams American
Economic Supremacy (20)(1900) was the old handbook for American empire
builders.
Childs writing in 1945 pointed out: "If Adams had written
last year, for publication this year, he would have had to alter scarcely
anything to relate his views to the world of today"(21). The same is true
for the period after 1991. The father of containment George Kennan , in
explaining and defending the policy of containment, mentioned Adam’s as
one of the small number of American’s who had recognized the proper basis
of foreign policy...Kennan’s analysis and argument was in many
respects similar to that of Adams."(22) The Truman Doctrine was a classic
example of the Frontier Thesis designed to facilitate American
expansionism, and in one speech Truman called it "The American Frontier".
"By the end of W.W.II , American leaders were thinking
even more explicitly within the pattern evolved in the 1890s."(23) "Like
a good many aspect of 20th century American history, the military definition
of the world was a direct product of the frontier-expansionist outlook.(24)
Admiral Mahan provided the earliest rationale for NATO.
"Expressing himself in a menacing and efficient attitude of physical force",
Mahan envisioned a future in which the industrial expansion led to a rivalry
for markets and sources of raw materials and would ultimately result in
need of power to open and conquer new markets. Sea power was the ultimate
vehicle for this expansion, the new "open door’ colonialism demanded the
services of American navy.
As Walter LaFeber points out, Mahan summarized his theory
in a postulate : "In these three things—production , with the necessity
of exchanging products, shipping , whereby the exchange is carried on,
and colonies...—is to be found the key to much of the history , as well
as the policy , of nations bordering on the sea"(25) Production leads to
a need for shipping , which in turn creates the need for colonies.(26)
John Hay’s "Open Door Notes" - the proclamation of American Lebensraum
in 1899, and 1900 signified the beginning of the American commercial invasion
of the world, the future American imperialist expansionism through the
policy of Open Door.(27) As I have already pointed out Woodrow Willson’s
words "World safe for democracy" translated in reality "World safe for
American Lebensraum". Wilson saw overseas economic expansion as the frontier
to replace the American continent that has been conquered. In a section
of volume V of his "History of the American People", which reads as a paraphrase
of essays written by Brooks Adams, Wilson claimed that United States is
destined to command "the economic fortunes of the world" through the "Open
Door" expansionism. "Diplomacy, and if need be, power, must make an open
way." In a series of lectures at Columbia University in April of 1907,
he was even more forthright:
"Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer
insists on having the world as a marked, the flag of his nation must follow
him, and the doors of the nations which are closed must be battered down…Concessions
obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even
if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process. Colonies
must be obtained or planted, in order that no useful corner of the world
may be overlooked or left unused"(28).
F. D. Roosevelt conceived his New Deal in geopolitical tradition
of Turner and Adams (29)— the New Deal as a New Frontier. American freedoms
could not be preserved in a frontierless society. United States was again
in search of new frontiers. "To expand the Open Door Policy to the world"
became the leitmotiv of American foreign policy.(30) The Secretary of Commerce
said: "We cannot permit the door to be closed against our trade in Eastern
Europe anymore than we can in China."(31) The Secretary of State Hughes
extended the Open Door Policy to all European colonies and Eastern Europe(32).
The Cold War was about the opening of the Russian and the Eastern European
frontiers for American expansionism and Open Door imperialism. The policy
of "containment", i.e. the traditional blockade of the Fortress Heartland
served the same purpose. Austin Bears had challenged in 1934 the
New Deal (Roosevelt’s Administration) to break with the expansionist tradition.
He implied that the New Deal would be involved in another war for empire.
Speaking through the National Foreign Trade Council the corporation community
opposed Beard resolutely: "National self-containment has no place in the
economic policy of the United States."(33)
"American leaders predicted that commercial expansion,
as long as the door remained open, would provide the United States with
the economic advantages of a formal empire without the political responsibilities
and moral liabilities connected with colonies"(34) Nevertheless the end
result of the "Open Door" expansionism was the economic colonization of
new geopolitical space. As the German geopolitician Otto Maull remarked:
"Complete economic penetration is the same as territorial occupation".
"Open Door" warfare inevitably leads to "Open Door " occupation.
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AMERICAN BLUEPRINT FOR WORLD HEGEMONY
The British geopolitician Peter J. Taylor introduces
in his book "Britain and the Cold War.1945 as Geopolitical Transition"
the concept of "Geopolitical world order" which denotes a geopolitical
regime of hegemony by a historical country- hegemon in the international
word-system and points out that "the geopolitical order that preceded the
Cold War has been termed the World Order of the British Succession."(36)
Both Nazi Germany and the United States had identical plans for Weltherschaft
and both countries were involved in a struggle for world hegemony
as successor of the previous geopolitical order of Pax Britannica. "…we
can interpret the two world wars as contests for the British succession
between Germany and USA"(37). As a result of the World War II the dominant
British political empire was replaced with a new American economic empire.(38)
Already prior to World War II United States began to plan for the coming
American world hegemony.
The minutes of the closet meetings that were held between
the State Department and the Council on Foreign Relations beginning in
1939 explicitly detail the role of the U.S. as a replacement for the British...The
minutes of the Council’s Security Sub-Committee of the Advisory Committee
of the Post-War Foreign Policy set the likely parameters of U.S. post-war
foreign policy: ‘..the British Empire as it existed in the past will ever
reappear and...the United States may have to take its place...’. The US
‘must cultivate a mental view toward world settlement after this war which
will enable us to impose our own terms, amounting... to Pax Americana.’(39)
. Americans could retain their vitality only by accepting the logic of
endless expansionism.(40) In 1942 , the Council’s director , Isaiah
Bowman , wrote, ’The measure of our victory will be the measure of our
domination after victory...(The US must secure areas) strategically necessary
for world control.’"(41)
The War and Peace Studies Project, initiated by the Council on
Foreign Relations during the F.D. Roosevelt Administration immediately
prior to the Second World War, was then the master plan and blueprint for
a new global order for the postwar world, an order in which the United
States would be the dominant power...The War and Peace Studies groups,
in collaboration with the American government ,worked out an imperialistic
conception of the national interests and war aims of the United States."
The American imperialism "involved a conscious attempt to organize and
control a global empire. The ultimate success of this attempt made the
United States...the number one world power , exercising domination over
large sections of the world—the American empire... Such blueprinting was
by its very nature determining the ‘national interest "(42) of the United
States....The purpose of postwar planning was the creation of an international
economic and political order dominated by the United States.(43)
Isaiah Bowman, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s chief geopolitician,
defined the foreign policy objectives of the United States as pursuit of
global policy of American Lebensraum in response to Nazi Germany’s Lebensraum.
Thus the war aims of United States and nazi-Germany were identical. Bowman
in collaboration with H.F. Armtrong even secured an article from
MacKinder on the danger of a strong Soviet Union which was published in
Foreign Affairs under the title "The Round World and the Winning
of the Peace"(44)
The article is remarkable because in it the old British imperialist
MacKinder in essence argues for transformation of the British Empire into
an American dependence and for the establishment of American hegemony in
Europe: …"Britain—moated stronghold—a Malta on a grander scale (for the
westward movement of the American empire) and France as a defensible bridgehead"(45)
Memorandum E-B19 concluded with a statement of the essentials
for the United States foreign policy, summarizing the "component parts
of an integrated policy to achieve military and economic supremacy of the
United States within the non-German world." Another main element was the
"coordination and cooperation of the United States with other countries
to secure the limitation of any exercise of sovereignty by foreign nations
that constitutes a threat to the minimum world area essential
to the security and economic prosperity of the United States and the Western
Hemisphere."(46)
At a meeting on October 19, 1940 Leo Posvolski, the Department
of State’s chief postwar planer , "agreed with the Council’s initial blueprint
for world power. His belief that the United States had to have more than
just the Western Hemisphere as living space is indicated in his statement
that ‘if you take the Western Hemisphere as the complete bloc you are assuming
preparation for war’(47). Posvolski thus felt that the United States would
have to go to war to gain more living space if limited to the Western Hemisphere,
a conclusion clearly following from the Council’s work."(48)
American economy need an elbow room, a new extended living space in order
to survive without major readjustments, claimed the planners of the Council
on Foreign Relations. That elbow room was conceptualized as the Grand Area,
(Grossraum) — the United States -led non German bloc which the United States
during 1941 called "world economy"(sic!).
The Economic and Financial Group’s studies had shown how
dangerous a unified Europe, with or without Nazi domination, would be to
the United States. Hamilton Fish Armstrong pointed out in mid-June
1941 that a unified Europe could not be allowed to develop because it would
be so strong that it would seriously threaten the American Grand Area.
Europe, organized as a single entity, was considered fundamentally incompatible
with the American economic system."(49)
AMERICA’S MINIMUM LEBENSRAUM - THE GRAND AREA
The extensive studies and discussions of the Council
group determined that, as a minimum , most of the non-German world, as
a new American ‘Grand Area’, was needed for elbow room.’ In its final form,
it consisted of the Western Hemisphere, the United Kingdom, the remainder
of the British Commonwealth and Empire, the Dutch East Indies, China and
Japan itself.(50)
Noam Chomsky summarizes the concept of American Lebensraum:
"The Grand Area was to include the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe,
the Far East, the former British Empire (which was being dismantled), the
incomparable energy resources of the Middle East (which were then passing
into American hands as we pushed out our rivals France and Britain), the
rest of the Third World and, if possible, the entire globe."(51) The whole
China was also included.
Unlike Carl Schmitt who in his geopolitical works used
the concept of Grossraum, (and Greater Area is the exact translation of
Grossraum), and who advocated a world order based on coexistence of Grossraüme,
the American concept had nothing to do with a delimited geopolitical space.
US deliberately rejected after the war the scenario of several Monroes
(52). Instead American expansionism had to be unlimited, rejecting
thus the very notion of competing national interests.
The War-Peace studies conceptually embodied the geopolitical
expansionism of Turner and Adams, the Weltanschauung of the American Open
Door imperialism. NSC -68 was nothing by restatement of those geopolitical
objectives, coached in the heavy theology of a modernized Manifest Destiny
Doctrine. (53)
ATLANTICISM
"The main political objective , both in peace and war
, must therefore be to prevent the unification of the Old World centers
of power in a coalition hostile to her own interests", wrote the American
geopolitician Nicholas Spykman in his book Geography of Peace,(54) restating
the main geopolitical objective of the United States in the post-war Europe.
"Spykman simply is repeating for the United States what has been an overriding
principle for British statecraft since the time of Henry VIII", comments
David Galleo (55).
To the same conclusion came also Hans J. Morgenthau : "United
States European policies largely parallel those of Great Britain from Henry
VIII to the end of the British Empire". Like Great Britain in the past
United States pursues one single objective in Europe— prevention of European
unity, rejection of the principle of balance of power and assertion of
unilateral American hegemony and preponderance of power.(56) After
the war the policies of American Lebensraum resulted in the formation of
the Atlantic Alliance, the new Grand Area envisioned by the planners of
the Council on Foreign Relations and the War and Peace studies project.
The American Grand Area was conceptualized and institutionalized as the
Atlantic Alliance.
The Atlanticism—the organizing principle of American postwar
policy toward Europe—was build on Europe’s political dependency. NATO—
the linchpin of American post war control— was the instrument to manage
American power projection in Europe, points Ronald Steel in his book "Temptations
of a Superpower" (57), in which he emphasizes that for the American post-war
planers a major objective was to prevent Europe from becoming in the future
an economic competitor because an economic competitor is likely to become
a political one too. The American national interest demanded prevention
of Continental unity.
Anticipating the creation of NATO, the leading American
geopolitician of US postwar expansionism Nicholas Spykman, propounded in
1943 the idea that "European power zone can be organized in a regional
League of Nations with the United States as a extra-regional member."(58)
Commenting on Spykman’s proposal, a leading American political scientist
Clyde Eagleton pointed out that : "This is simply incredible-either that
the United States would take on such a risk , or that other states would
permit such interference from outside."(59) Acceptance of the American
proposals would only mean consent to the establishment of American protectorate
over those European states.
Reformulating the old Turnerian "Frontier thesis" Spykman
wrote "We have seen the frontier from an international point of view as
an expression of a relative power relationship, as that line where conflicting
pressures became equalized. From a national point of view of the individual
state, the frontier is the front trench held during the temporary armistice
called peace"(60)
The Europeanist influence tended to see the Atlantic system
built around American hegemony as a transitional construction, born of
exceptional European weakness, bound to be transformed if not discarded
once that weakness had passed. Implied was the view that Europe was not
to be dominated indefinitely.
Geopolitical Atlanticism envisioned just that indefinite
domination. Political Atlanticism saw NATO as a pillar for such indefinite
domination and as instrument for power managing of European geopolitical
space. Atlanticism is a sort of political religion of expansionism
with its geopolitical catechism and doctrine of immaculate conception of
American foreign policy. (Although- befitting its Anglo-Saxon origin, the
Atlantic catechism appears less systematized and less doctrinaire)"(61),
write David P. Galleo and Benjamin M. Rowland in their book "America and
the World Political Economy. Atlantic Dreams and National Realities".
In the frameworks of the American imperialist Weltanschauung
the establishment of American protectorate over Europe could be accomplished
through NATO.(62) The Atlantic imperial mantle and American grand schemes
for a world military empire were epitomized in the Atlantic Alliance. David
Galleo and Benjamin Rowland point out that: "Hull’s free-trade imperialism
might have been expected , but not a new Roman Empire with an Atlantic
Mare Nostrum. It was almost as the United States , spurning Europe’s colonies,
had decided to annex the mother countries instead (63).
The Atlantic Alliance, envisioned already by Brooks Adams,
"marked the hegemony of America over Europe (64). Henceforth an American
general , answerable to the President , will usurp the political prerogatives
of Europe. And with the Truman Doctrine a spatially alien power —the United
States, asserted and gained control over Western Europe, obliterating thus
the independent political existence of former Great Powers, including its
own ally Great Britain.
NATO AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE
The geopolitical concept of American Lebensraum—the
Atlantic Great Area of American power preponderance —needed a direct power
projection in order to guarantee American dominion. NATO became the institution
of hegemony par excellence.
The architects of the American Empire envisioned for NATO the
same role as admiral Mahan envisioned for the Navy – a vehicle for conquest
of new markets and geopolitical space and an instrument for the implementation
of the "open door " policy and geopolitical space management. In short
NATO became the military arm of the westward movement of the American Empire.
The "frontier thesis" of the American foreign policy and the Monroe Doctrine
did confluence in NATO. The Marshall Plan, followed by NATO,
began in earnest the era of American military, political , and economic
dominance over Europe, points Stephen Ambrose.(65)
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge considered NATO as one of series
of regional organizations designed to hem in the Soviet Union. Thus NATO
was also constructed as an instrument of the strategy of blockade of the
fortress "Heartland" , identical with the Soviet Union. (Spykman’s concept
of the countries of Rimland which had to be controlled by the United States
must be seen as geopolitical theory of blockade).
NATO would assert American domination over Western
Europe while simultaneously allowing the United States to assume a position
of undisputed hegemony over Europe. What that hegemony would be "was adequately
, if somewhat crudely , summed up in the frequent references to the extension
of the Monroe Doctrine. Europe would become, for the American businessman,
soldier and foreign policy maker, another Latin America" Senator Tom Conally
declared "the Atlantic Pact is but the logical extension of the Monroe
Doctrine."(66)
NSC -68 represented the practical extension of the
Truman Doctrine , which has been world-wide in its implications but limited
to Europe in its application . The document provided justification for
America’s assuming the role of world policeman.(67) It was designed to
not only to preserving the power of USA but to extend and consolidate power
by absorbing new satellites and to prevent the rise of competing system
of
power.
In order to understand the threat that NATO poses
against the security of Russia and other European countries, it is necessary
to go to the origin of the so called Atlantic Alliance. The North Atlantic
Treaty, in its origin, was not an alliance at all, but an unilateral US
guarantee of what US termed European security, and factually an assertion
of American hegemony in Western Europe under the disguise of security.
The essential condition of the original US-European relationship , formulated
in 1949, was totally one-sided. Its raison d’etre allegedly was security
— in reality it was hegemony, in fact an enlargement of the Monroe Doctrine,
such as the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, which initially mostly
effected Great Britain which had to cease—as in the case of Greece— her
spheres of influence to the United States. It allowed the United States
to gain supreme command over Western European armed forces and also to
station American troops on European soil. An editorial in the Wall Street
Journal in April of 1949 correctly characterized the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization "as nullifying the principles of the United Nations."(68)
Historically speaking the unilaterally proclaimed
Truman Doctrine was an extension of the Monroe Doctrine across the Atlantic,
i.e. a major enlargement of the American Grossraum— a globalization of
the principles of the Western Hemisphere Grossraum, where the United States
is the sole bearer of sovereignty — and thus the first direct assault on
the sovereignty of European states. Although ostensibly promoted as a device
of containment and a policy for global intervention, it was in reality
a device of subjugation and expansionism, serving American policy of Lebensraum..
The British foreign policy scholar Kenneth Thompson called the Truman Doctrine
a national and expedient act designed initially to replace British with
American power in Central Europe.(69)
Charles de Gaulle, the great French statesman with a kin
eye for geopolitics and propensity to dismantle American myths, rightfully
asserted that NATO was a mere appendage to the United States and that NATO
and (French) national sovereignty were incompatible objectives. Already
in 1951 (June 12) the Paris weekly Le Monde summarized the essence of the
Atlantic Alliance and its military arm NATO:
"The fundamental inequality of the alliance is turning
it more and more into a hidden protectorate in which protestation of national
pride are not enough to compensate for a growing enslavement. The Roman
Empire had its citizens, its allies, and its foreigners. The new American
Empire has its allies of the first zone (the Americans), its allies of
the second zone (the British), and its continental protégés:
In spite of all their haughtiness, the latter are becoming to an ever increasing
extend the Filipinos of the Atlantic."
Leopold Kohr concluded that the Atlantic Alliance
is not a partnership of equality , and that there is only one nation which
is truly free in this new arrangement, "the imperial nation, the American."(70)
As Walter LaFeber has pointed out with the formation of NATO United States
accomplished their victory in what LaFeber calls the First Cold War which
President Wilson started already at the Versailles Peace Conference after
the end of the First World War and the end result of which was the establishment
of American control over the Western Europe i.e. over a significant portion
of Eurasia.
After the end of the Cold War the role of NATO as instrument
of American expansionism, an instrument for administration, control and
enlargement of the American empire, became more clear than ever. Quoting
the French author J.J. Servan Schreiber Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher
Layne describe the roll of the USA in the post-cold war period as a head
of world empire. "Fifty years after NATO founding, as the post-cold
war alliance finds itself at war, the time has come to reassess US imperial
policy in Europe. The war in Yugoslavia is a watershed in NATO’s history.
Today , the United States has expanded the alliance’s geographical scope
and created a new role for it: intervention in the internal affairs of
sovereign states whose domestic policies offend NATO’s values - even when
such states pose no security threat to the alliance’s partners… Hidden
by all lofty (and misleading) rhetoric about NATO and transatlantic partnership
is a simple fact: US policy in Europe aims not to counter others’ bids
for hegemony but to perpetuate America’s own supremacy...NATO expansion
may prove to be a diplomatic blunder on a par with the 1919 Versailles
Treaty...".(71)
Schwarz and Layne point out that NATO serves the
following important functions:
-
Defending and expanding the imperial frontiers of the United States.
-
Establishment of permanent US protectorate over the continent and
-
Undermining the emergence of independent Western Europe.
NATO was used to undermine the pre-existing world order based on the Helsinki
agreement and to obliterate the independent role of the United Nations.
NATO became an instrument of conquest of the Eastern Europe – "peacefully"
as in the case of the Visegrad–countries (Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic
) or by resorting to outright war of aggression (Yugoslavia). Containment
of Western Europe and conquest of the Eastern Europe are the two main functions
of NATO.
In the verdict rendered at the concluding session of the
International War Crimes Tribunal Investigating U.S. NATO War Crimes in
Yugoslavia on January 23, 2000 in Kiev, Ukraine, NATO was declared a criminal
institution within the purview of the Nuremberg codex.
Once again, and now after the end of the Cold War, Europe
as a geopolitical entity is faced by a historical choice — either independent
geopolitical existence as a Mitteleuropa or European community, or a future
as dependent appendage to the American empire. An independent geopolitical
existence — Europe for Europeans — translates into a Mitteleuropa as antihegemonic
block facing and competing with the American Atlantic Grossraum. The most
simple geopolitical axiom is that NATO is a threat to a future European
independence. And above all- NATO is a threat to Russia.
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ENDNOTES
(1) See Anders Stephenson
Manifest Destiny. American Expansion and the Empire of Right (Hill and
Wang, New York, 1995) p. XI.
(2) Josiah Strong Our Country: Its Possible Future
and Its Present Crisis (New York, 1985) , p. 20. Here quoted from Walter
LaFeber The New Empire (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1963) , p. 74.
(3) Ambrose, Stephen E. The Military Dimension: Berlin,
NATO and NCS-68 in Paterson, Thomas G.(ed.) The Origins of the Cold War
(D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, MA, 1974) p. 178.
(4) Turner, Frederick Jackson The Significance of the
Frontier in American History (Henry Holt and Co, New York, 1995) p. 1.
(5) Turner, Frederick Jackson ibid. p.33.
(6) Turner, Frederick Jackson, ibid. p.p. 33, 59.
(7) William Appleman Williams The Frontier Thesis and
American Foreign Policy in Henry W. Berger (ed.) A William Appleman Williams
Reader (Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, 1992) p. 90.
(8) William Appleman Williams The Frontier Thesis and
American Foreign Policy p. 91.
(9) Brooks Adams, The Law of Civilization and Decay (The
MacMillan Co, New York, 1896).
(10) William Appleman Williams The Frontier Thesis and
American Foreign Policy p. 92.
(11) William Appleman Williams The Frontier Thesis and
American Foreign Policy p. 96.
(12) Brooks Adams The New Empire (The MacMillan Co, New
York, 1900).
(13) ibid. p. 96.
(14) Williams ibid. 97.
(15) ibid. p. 98.
(16) ibid. p. 99, 100.
(17) Brooks Adams America’s Economic Supremacy, p.p. 80,
104-05, David P. Calleo and Benjamin Rowland America and the World Political
Economy p. 273.
(18) Thomas J. McCormick America’s Half-Century (John
Hopkins University Press , Baltimore, 1995) p. 18.
(19) McCormick ibid. p.p. 18-19.
(20) Brooks Adams America’s Economic Supremacy (The MacMillan
Co, New York, 1900).
(21) Ibid. p. 100.
(22) ibid. p. 101.
(23) William Appleman Williams The Contours of American
History , Norton and Company, New York, 1988, p. 474.
(24) William Appleman Williams Contours of American History
p. 473.
(25) A.T. Mahan The Influence of Sea Power upon History,
1660-1783 (Boston, 1890) pp.. 53, 28.
(26) Walter LaFeber The New Empire. An Interpretation
of American Expansion 1860-1898 (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1963)
p. 88.
(27) Williams ibid. p. 86.
(28) Williams, William Appleman The Tragedy of American
Diplomacy p.p. 71, 72.
(29) Graebner p. 134.
(30) Graebner p. 134.
(31) (Charles Evans Hughes p.. 86).
(32) William Appleman Williams The Contours of American
History p. 454.
(33) Lloyd C. Gardner The New Deal, New Frontiers, and
the Cold War: A Re-examination of American Expansion, 1933-1945 in David
Horowitz (ed) Corporations and the Cold War (Monthly Review Press, New
York, 1969) p. 108.
(35) Dorpalen, Andreas The World of General Houshofer.
Geopolitics in Action (New York, 1942), p.224.
(36) Peter J. Taylor "Britain and the Cold War. 1945 as
Geopolitical Transition" (Guilford Publications,Inc, New York 1990) p.
17. The concept of "Geopolitical regime of hegemony" , used by Taylor,
is quite similar to the concept of "Historical regime of hegemony " in
the political writings of Antonio Gramsci.
(37) Peter J. Taylor ibid. p. 17.
(38) Peter J. Taylor ibid . p. 17.
(39) Michio Kaku and Daniel Axelrod To Win a Nuclear War.
The Pentagon’s Secret War Planes (South end Press, Boston, 1987) p.p. 63,
64.
(40) Those views were expressed by Reinhold Niebuhr who,
like many American Cold War planners viewed the American future political
destiny as Manichean interpretation of the virtually uninterrupted warfare-
from the point of the revamped Manifest Destiny Doctrine. In this conjunction
one may recall the view of the American foreign policy by William Appleman
Williams.
In order to understand the foreign policy of expansionism
of the United States Williams urged his students "to study the pirates
as a protocommunity which sought in the Renaissance era and afterwards
to create its own rules , and prompted widespread fear in the existing
empires". See Paul M. Buhle and Edward Rice-Maximin William Appleman Williams
. The Tregedy of Empire (Routledge, New York and London, 1995) p. 236.
One may also recall that while still allies already during
the World War II the United States started to prepare for war with the
Soviet Union. In the summer of 1945 , at the time of the Conference in
Potsdam United States adopted a policy of ‘string the first blow’ in a
nuclear war against the Soviet Union. To that effect a secret document
JCS 1496 was drafted on July 19, 1945. (p. 30).
The first plan for nuclear attack was drafted soon afterwards
by General Dwight Eisenhower at the order of PresidentTruman. The
plan. called TOTALITY (JIC 329/1) envisioned a nuclear attack on the Soviet
with 20 to 30 A-bombs. The plan earmarked 20 Soviet cities for obliteration
in a first strike: Moscow, Gorki, Kuibyshev, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk,
Saratov, Kazan, Leningrad, Baku, Tashkent, Chelyabinsk, Nizhni Tagil, Magnitogorsk,
Molotov, Tbilisi, Stalinsk, Grozny, Irkutsk, and Jaroslavl Michio Kaku
and Daniel Axelrod To Win a Nuclear War. The Pentagon’s Secret War Planes
(South end Press, Boston, 1987) pp. 30, 31.
(41) Michio Kaku and Daniel Axelrod To Win a Nuclear War.
The Pentagon’s Secret War Planes (South end Press, Boston, 1987) pp. 63,64.
(42) Lavrence H. Shoup & William Minter Imperial Brain
Trust (Monthly Review Press, New York 1977, p. 117.
(43) Lawrence Shoup & William Minter ibid. p. 118.
(44) Martin Geoffrey The Life and Thought of Isaiah Bowman
(Archon Books, Hamden, Connecticut, 1980) p. 177. One may also recall that
Isaiah Bowman already in his in 1921 published book "The New World" envisioned
the coming American world empire. Carl Haushofer published in 1934 a trilogy
of books titled "Macht und Erde" which, according to Otto Maull, was written
as the German response to Bowman’s "The New World". Martin Geoffrey,
ibid. p. 165.
(45) MacKinder, Halford "The Round World and the Winning
of the Peace" in Democratic Ideals and Reality (W.W. Norton & Co, New
York, NY 1962) p. 274. MacKinder’s article was originally published in
Foreign Affairs, vol.1 (July 1943) p.p. 595-605.
(46) Memorandum E-B19, October 19, 1940, CFR, War-Peace
Studies , NUL. Here quoted after Shoup & Minter, ibid. p. 130.
(47) Posvolsky’s statement is in Memorandum A-A11, October
19, 1940 War Peace Studies , Baldwin Papers, Box 117, YUL from which Shoup
&
Minter quote .
(48) Shoup & Minter ibid. p. 131.
(49) Shoup & Minter, ibid. p. 137.
(50) Shoup & Minter , ibid p. 136.
(51) Noam Chomsky What Uncle Saw Really Wants p. 12 (Odonian
Press, Berkeley, 1992). The policies of American Lebensraum and the geopolitical
construct of the American Greater Area are discussed in dept in Joyce and
Gabriel Kolko The Limits of Power. The world and United States Foreign
Policy (Harper and Row, New York, 1972) .
(52) See Taylor, Peter J. Britain and the Cold War. 1945
as Geopolitical Transition (Gilfor Publications, New York, 1990. Not only
Carl Schmitt but also General Haushofer advocated peaceful coexistence
of several competing "Grand Areas" or "Monroes". Carl Schmitt used the
concept of Grossraum, General Haushofer of "Pan-region".
(53) The political objectives stated in the NSC-68 were
after the end (sic!) of the Cold War again restated in the Pentagons Defense
Planning Guidance. With the Soviet Union gone United States embarked on
a new policy of expansionism.
(54) Nicholas Spykman Geography of Peace , New York, 1944.
(55) David Galleo ibid. p. 30.
(56) Hans J. Morgenthau The Mainsprings of American Foreign
Policy Robert A. Goldwin (ed) Readings in American Foreign Policy (Oxford
University Press, New York, 1971) p. 642.
(57) Ronald Steel Temptations of a Superpower ( Harvard
University Press, 1995) p. 70.
(58) N. Spykman America’s Strategy in World Politics p.
468.
(59) Clyde Eagleton, Review of America’s Strategy in World
Politics , 222 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
(July 1942), 189-190, P. 190. here quoted in David Willkinson Spykman and
Geopolitics in C. Zoppo and C. Zorgbibe (eds) On Geopolitics: Classical
and Nuclear (Martinus Nijhoff, Dortrecht, 1985), p. 82.
(60) Nickolas J. Spykman and A.A. Rollins "Geographical
Objectives in Foreign Policy I, American Political Science Review , vol.
33 , 1939 , p.394
(61) David P. Galleo and Benjamin M. Rowland America and
the World Political Economy. Atlantic Dreams and National Realities (Indiana
University Press, Bloomington, 1973) p. 18.
(62) Ibid. p. 44.
(63) Ibid. p. 46.
(64) Ibid. p. 61.
(65) Stephen E. Ambrose, The Military Dimension : Berlin,
NATO and NSC-68 in Thomas G. Paterson The Origins of the Cold War (D.C.
Heath and Company, Lexington, 1974) p. 178.
(66) Stephen E. Ambrose The Military Dimension :
Berlin, NATO and NSC-68 in Thomas G. Paterson The Origins of the Cold War
(D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, 1974) p. 117.
(67) Stephen E. Ambrose , ibid. p. 182.
(68) The Wall Street Journal, April 5, 1949.
(69) Kenneth Thompson -Political Realism and the Crisis
of World Politics- An American Approach (Princeton University Press, Princeton,
1960) - at p. 124.
(70) Leopold Kohr -The Breakdown of Nations -ibid., at
p. 203.
(71) Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne "NATO: At
50, It’s Time to Quit" (The NATION Magazine, May 10, 1999 pp.17, 18.
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