Last Updated: July 13, 2003
A drawing of the 1M Soviet Mars Probe.
(C) Paolo Ulivi created with CATIA v.4.2.2
The first Soviet interplanetary probes were as ambitious as the US
ones (see the Mariner A page).
The Sergei Pavlovich Korolev bureau, the same bureau that built the
8K71 and 8K72, the first Sputniks and the first Luna probes began
studying in 1958 a family of probes that could explore Venus (launch in
June 1959, on the same launch window as Pioneer-5)
and Mars (launch in September 1960). The probes, respectively
designated 1V and 1M were to weigh about 400
kg and were to be launched by the same 8K72 that launched the lunar
probes Luna-1 to Luna-3. However, there were many technical probes with
the 8K72 and the bureau decided to skip the launch window of 1959 and to
use a new rocket for the Mars window. The rocket was a three stage
version of the 8K71 and was designated 8K78. On an 8K71 first stage and
boosters (which the Soviets and Russians called a second stage) were
mounted Block I and Block L. Block I stage took Block L into low Earth
orbit, where Block L was to re-ignite and to propel the probe to the
planets. The 8K78 booster, later named Molniya (lightning) after
a series of communication satellites, could launch up to 1.5 tons to the
Moon and something less to Mars and Venus.
Work on the 1M probe began in 1958. It was a very complex probe, with
three-axis stabilization ensured by Sun and stellar optical sensors and
a backup gyroscopic platform. From the start, it was decided to attempt
the most difficult mission a space probe could perform, namely to
penetrate the target planet's atmosphere and to land a module on the
surface.
This kind of mission had to confront with two huge problems:
fundamental physic parameters of the atmosphere being unknown (such as
pressure, density and temperature profile, and its composition), the
team had to trust Earth based studies. And the peculiarities of the
probe descent into the atmosphere "from the top" were not to be
easily recreated on Earth with an aerial dropping. It was thus
created a new version of the R-11A scientific rocket (itself derived
from the famed R-11 "Scud" IRBM ), named R-11A-MV (Mars and Venus). The
R-11A-MV rocket took the entry capsule up to 50 km from Earth, from
where it descended on three parachutes (the Mars probe) or two
parachutes (the Venus probe).
However, the great uncertainty on the parameters of the Martian
atmosphere (the pressure alone varied by a whole degree of magnitude
from a scientific article to another) and on the planetary ephemerides
itself (with an error bar much larger than the diameter of the planet)
suggested that a simpler mission be prepared, namely, a fly-by mission
from a distance between 5,000 and 30,000 km.
Instead of the entry capsule, on the probe were mounted many scientific
instruments: a magnetometer, an IR radiometer, a charged particle
sensor, a micrometeorite sensor, a camera and a spectroreflectometer
able to measure the absorption of the CH radical in the Martian
atmosphere, a clear indicator of organic life. All the instruments were
mounted on the exterior of the probe except the camera, which was
mounted inside a pressurized module with a small window. A sensor was to
detect the entry of Mars in the field of view of the camera and to
start the picture taking session. The images were taken on photographic
film which was then developed, scanned and transmitted to Earth.
The 1M probe was built around a central cylinder two meters long for a
diameter of 105 cm, pressurized at 1,200 hPa, inside which was mounted
the mission electronics. On the exterior of the cylinder were mounted
two solar panels wings 1 meter wide for a total surface of 2 sq. meters
and a spider web parabolic high gain antenna 2.33 meters wide. The probe
weighted 650 kg and carried a bipropellant (dimetylhydrazine and nitric
acid) engine system for attitude control.
A long series of tests on the probe showed a lot of problems: the
electrical system was not working correctly, as neither the
radiocomunication system, nor even the rocket separation system. And the
tests on the hermeticity of the pressure hull were never carried out.
The launch window to Mars opened in September 1960, with an optimum
launch date between the 20th and the 25th. Between these dates, the
flight time to Mars would have been minimized and the payload maximized.
The fly-by was scheduled for the end of April, 1961.
Since the start of the Block L stage had to happen over the Atlantic
Ocean, three ships modified to collect and record the telemetry of the
probe and the rocket were sent to sea in August. For these new Soviet
space missions a new Deep Space Communication Center was built in
Yevpatoria, in Crimea. The center was comprised of three
radiotelescopes, each of which used eight 16-meters diameter antennae.
The center was declared ready for the mission on September 26, 1960 but
was actually finished on January 1961, when the antenna were calibrated
on galactic radio sources.
A few days before the start, one of the three 1M probes being readied
for the mission had a serious problem to the camera system, which
necessitated some day to be fixed.
By this time, however, the optimal launch date was gone and the payload
of the Molniya decreased from day to day until the end of the launch
window. It was then decided to discard the camera system to lower the
probe's mass. According to another version, the spectroreflectometer was
discarded, after it failed to detect life in the Kazakhstan's steppe.
The first 1M arrived to the launch pad on October 8 and was launched
two days later. In this occasion, the central stage of the rocket
developed such a strong vibration that part of the Block I control
system was damaged. 309 seconds after lift-off the emergency shutdown
happened and the probe fell to Earth over Siberia. Four days later the
second 1M had a similar fate, when the Block I refused to start after a
non hermetic oxygen valve let go some liquid oxygen that freezed
kerosene in the alimentation ducts.
As the launch window was closing, a third 1M was never launched.
Both launches were also tracked by an US intelligence station located
in Turkey. The west thus learned of the existence of the probes some
thirty years before they were disclosed by the Russians.
For quite some time, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, there
were rumors of a third Mars probe attempt on October 24, just hours
before the launch window closed. This was, in fact, the failed launch
attempt of a Yangel R-16 ICBM which exploded on the pad killing a still
uncertain number of engineers and technicians. As much as 165 men died
in the explosion, including Soviet Air Force marshall Mitrofan Nedelin.
In the same days the USSR Communist Party Secretary Nikita Khruschev
was in New York for a United Nation reunion and, according to a
diserting sailor, on his ship there was a model of the probe, to show
the assembly in case any of the launches made it. It was in this
occasion that Khrushev banged his shoe on the UN table.
The story of early Soviet probes of the 1MV family is continued in Venera-1 page.
Bibliography
Grahn, S.: The
US Deep Space Collection Program
Lardier, C.: L'Astronautique Sovietique, Paris, Armand Colin,
pp. 116-117 (in French)
Perminov, V. G.: The Difficult Road to Mars; Washington, NASA,
pp. 7-8
Semenov, Yu. P.: Roketno-Kosmicheskaya Korporatsiya Energhiya;
Moscow, RKK Energhiya, pp. 140-141 (in Russian)
Varfolomeyev, T.: Soviet Rocketry that Conquered Space, Part 4;
Spaceflight, January 1998, pp. 28-30
Varfolomeyev, T.: Soviet Rocketry that Conquered Space, Part 5;
Spaceflight, March 1998, pp. 85-88
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